The Z Document: 'Mr. X' in Our Time

By William Safire

WASHINGTON he cold war is over; the free world won and the evil empire lost; let's pick a date for V-C Day and celebrate the history-ending victory over Communism." So say our triumphalists.

"The cold war is over; it was largely our uptight right-wingers' fault to begin with because the Russians were never coming." So say our

sore winners.

Gorbophiles and Gorbophobes are on all fours in the same mindset: it's

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all over but the happy distribution of the peace dividend.

A ragtag band, taking exception to this consensus, is derided by both sides as unreconstructed cold warriors, skunks at the garden party of the nifty 90's. From Moscow, Brezhnevite retreads accuse us of howling because we were deprived, cold turkey, of our beloved Communist enemy.

We dissenters from the widespread wow-ee worldview have been reduced to Yogi Berra geopolitics — "the cold war ain't over till it's over." We mutter that Mr. Gorbachev is motivated only by the threat of incipient collapse, not by an interest in abandoning iron control. We warn that as soon as the West ameliorates the economic pain, the necessity for glasnost and free enterprise will lessen and the totalitarian system will survive.

Now, in the nick of time, comes substantial intellectual underpinning for the don't-save-Communism gang.

The American Academy of Arts and Sciences is based in Cambridge, Mass., not exactly a reactionary redoubt. The Academy publishes a quarterly, Daedalus, named after the Athenian who built an ingenious labyrinth.

Next week, an article will appear in that review titled "To the Stalin Mausoleum" (a play on Edmund Wilson's "To the Finland Station," about Lenin) and signed by "Z," a pseudo-nym recalling the "X" used by George Kennan a lifetime ago in suggesting a policy of containment.

Z surveys the 70 years leading to the political graveyard in a way that illuminates this past decade's events. Awareness of looming disaster began in Yuri Andropov's K.G.B.; the Novosibirsk Report by the sociologist Tatyana Zaslavskaya in 1983 "implied the necessity of radical restructuring for sheer survival"; its leaking (touted in this space) "first alerted the world to the impending end of Soviet stability."

Gorbachev was "Andropov redux," and at first tried to revitalize the Communist Party; when that failed, he built a parallel apparat — "reminiscent, mutatis mutandis, of the way Stalin had used the N.K.V.D. against

the mainline Party.'


Recent elections, held to insure Gorbachev against Khrushchev's fate of removal by the Central Committee, had an unintended result: "to produce a resounding defeat not just for the apparat, as Gorbachev wished, but for the Party as an institution. ... the Party, which had hitherto inspired fear in the people, suddenly came to fear the population....


But the people's interests are not being served by the Communist Party or Gorbachev's parallel Sovietist apparat; private cooperatives were corrupted by the local political mafias, and decentralization was subverted because it threatened the party's monopoly of power. Result: "Gorbachev is left with the worst of two possible worlds: an old one that refused to die and a new one without the strength to be born.'

Excerpts from the conclusion of Z's analysis are printed on this Op-Ed page. If they pique your interest, glom on to the magazine or insert' yourself into the samizdat of faxes. and photocopies that will follow the publication of the seminal article.

Gorbachev, trying to be both Luther and the Pope, cannot fix the stultifying system without going much further than he says he is willing or able to go. But, warns Z (an ideological soulmate whose identity I have no need to know), "decaying superpowers do not go quietly into the night.'

In the historical epoch aborning, don't join the crowd expecting serenity or preaching stability. And don't start spending that peace dividend; as Tocqueville observed in Z's keynote, "The most dangerous time for a bad government is when starts to reform itself."





The following article is adapted from the conclusion of a longer historical analysis to be published under the pseudonym "2" in the winter issue of Deaddus, journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Deaddus is witholding the ences, Deaddus is witholding the author's request. All parties at the author's request. All parties at the author's request. All parties at the ITA New York Timpsix Opin Territical author's name from all parties at the author's request. (Although it is not The New York Times's usual practice to withhold an author's identity, it is honoring Daedalus's commitment.)

is clear that 1889 will enter history as the beginning of Communian's terminal crisis, and not just in Russia but from the Bairic to the China Sea, and from Berlin to Betting.

It is also clear that perestrolka and glasmat, welcome in their intention, have in their application not) aggravated the systemic crisis they were the control of the control of the control of the system they are trying to save.

Mikhail Gorbachev has been trying to prompte soft Communism through structures and a population programmed for hard Communism though structures and a population programmed for hard Communism though structures and a population programmed for hard Communism though structures and a population programmed for hard Communism but the latter is the only variety of Sovietism is the genuine article, for the essence of all varieties of Sovietism is the genuine article, for the essence of all varieties of Sovietism's troubles.

The way out of this contradiction? As one Soviet reformer put it after the June Congress: "The country now stands at a crossroads. From here we either go the Chinese way or the Polish-Hungarian way." Aithough the obviously wished for the latter course, the alternative he posed may well be a Hoboton's choice.

The Chinese way since June 1889 means relative, though now declining, market prosperity under a regime of political and military repression. Repression is certainly a possibility in Russia, but market prosperity is out of the question for the indefinite future. Conversely, the Polish-Hungarian way means genuine democracy, but in the midst of economic ruin to severe as to threaten the survival of the new constitutional order.

In Russia, the economic ruin is seven or the agenda. Thus, the Russian way could well combine the worst of the Chinese and the Central European scenarios: economic failure in conjunction with an inexpungable leading role for the party.

Indeed, all paths of Communist reform seem to end in one or another type of impasse. Leninist regimes, when they either the final decline, s

in Poland, Rungary, East Germany, Czechoslowskia and Rumania, or to dig in their heels militarily to slave off implosion, as under Deng Xiaoping in 1889. And this grim impass at the end of utopia in power is the outcome of the structures that power built. The whole impossible enterprise of Lenin and Stalin was sustainable only as long as the human and material resources on which the system fed retained the vitality to ender the burden of the regime, and as long as some modicum of material success undergirded the party's monopolistic position.

When these conditions ceased to hold, beginning with Deng Xiaoping's marketization of 1979 and Solidarity's revolt of 1890, the Communist parties' will to power began to fide and their people's habit of fear began to fade. For the Soviet party-state's survival, the feat-consett seconds mercade necessity.

marketization of 1979 and solionary and several of 1800, the Communist parties' will to power began to flag and their people's habit of fear began to fade. For the Soviet party-state's survival, this development soon made necessary the expedients of perestrolize and glasmost. But these are only pale substitutes for the market and democracy, halfway measures designed to square the circle of making the vivifying forces of a resurrected

civil society compatible with the par-ty's leading role.

But this circle cannot be squared. If marketization and privatization are the economic goals of reform, then indeed forming becomes jugaritious, indeed downright parasitical. If mul-tiple parties, elections and the rule of law are the political goals of reform then the dual administration of the

tiple parties, elections and the rule of law are the political goal of reform, then the dual administration of the party-state becomes supernumerary, indeed positively noxious.

There is no third way between Leninism and the market, between Bolshevism and constitutional government. Marketization and democratization lead to the revival of civil society, and such a society requires the rule of law is incompatible with the preservation of the lawless leading rule of the party.

At some point, theyfore, the line will be reached where reform crosses or the rule of all the structures is has created. Russia and Central Europe are reaching that critical line. The false problem of how to restructure Leninism is now giving way to the real problem of how to restructure Leninism is now giving way to the real problem of how to dismantle the system, how to effect at last an exit from Communism. Perestroika is not a solution but a transition to this exit. As Milovan Diplias foresaw early in perestroika, Communism is not reforming itself—it is disintegrating. So, as we rub our eyes in astonishment at the most stunning Communist implosion of all, the collapse of the Berlin wall, we should not conclude that the structures it shielded for so long can be transformed by a few reform decrees. The revolutionary rapidity of events in 1989 should not breed the tillusion that the exit from Communism these events presage will itself be repid.

And the most difficult case of all will be the Soviet Union, Russia, after all, has had 70, not 45 years of Sovietism. Also, the Soviet perty is a national institution, not an alien imposition, with deep roots in the patriotic success of World War II. Finally, this national impositions, with deep roots in the patriotic success of World War II. Finally, this national impositions.

tion, with deep roots in the patriotic success of World War II. Finally, this national-imperial party has the military apparatus of a superpower.

Can Mr. Gorbacher succeed? Should we help him? To answer these questions meaningfully, we must first rephrase them. Succeed at what? Help him to do what?

Help him to do what?

If by perestrolika's success we mean producing a Communis: system that is economically effective and politically democratic, then the answer must be no. The fundamental structures of the Lenihist system reached an inestricable impasse at the end of the 187%, and the mounting contradictions of perestrolika indicate that the system cannot be restructured or reformed, but can only either sugnate or be dismattled and replaced by market institutions over a long period of time.

In this case, any aid the West might render to the Soviet state to save or improve the existing system would be futile: On this score, Mr. Gorbachev is beyond our help. Such aid would also work against the real interests of the restive Soviet peoples and thus of international stability. Like Western

irst, redecing the mutual burden for armaments, if carrido out with due attention to legitimate accounty concerns, would ease the severity of the Soviet crisis (though it would not after its structural causes). And Mr. Gorbachev has clearly indicated his willingness to engage in arms reductions, while taking care that the Soviet Union's international retreat does not turn into a rox.

Second, although Western aid about not go to shoring up Soviet constitutions, while taking care that the Soviet Union's international retreat does not turn into a rox.

Second, although Western aid should not go to shoring up Soviet constitution of the soviet Union's international process of the international process of parallel structures in a private sector operating on market principles so as to promote economic and, eventually, political pluralism. This could take the form, say, of free economic zones operating under International Monetary Fund conditions in such places as the Ballic states, Armenia or the Soviet Far East. In this case, the expectation would be that such a parallel sector, perhaps with its own convertible currency, would eventually spread across the Soviet Union.

Such a policy is, indeed, a modest approximation of the approach that the Government is now inaugurating in Poland. But what Mr. Gorbachev is prepared to accept for the inner empire of the Soviet Union itself, since foreign investment would imperil national sovereignty.

So Western investment, in joint or other enterprises in Russia, would have to be handled without triumphalism about capitalism's superiority, and with due sonativity to Soviet realities while leaving the old labels interpret to a kind of seedilate-emperior-ol-Japan arrangement.

Yet, however the Soviet Union edges toward its particular exit from Communism, this uncharided process control yet long a department of the control of the contr

credits to Poland in the 1870's, aid to the Soviet Government would only prolong the agenty.

Yet, if by perestrible is success we mean effecting a transition from a party-state and a command economy to democracy and the market, then the answer, unfortunately, must still be no. Pirat, such a transition is make the sim of perestrible; its slim, rather than the space of the system by halfway house concessions to economic and done in reality. Second, and even could bring present such a transition to companie to the self-diquidation of Communism, something for and hence would amount to the bell-diquidation of Communism, something for composition of Communism, something for Communism, the subject that Communism, the composition of the system when the subject to look realistically at the period of communism the period of conflict in history. Nor about Mr. Gorbacheva as a demition of communism of the period of conflict in history. Nor about Mr. Gorbacheva as a demition of communism, the communism of the period of conflict in history. Nor about Mr. Gorbacheva as a demition of communism, the communism of the period of conflict in history. Nor about Mr. Gorbacheva as a demition of communism, the communism of the period of conflict in history. Nor about Mr. Gorbacheva as a demition of communism, the period of conflict in history. Nor about Mr. Gorbacheva as a demitide dudget and the execution of conflict in history. Nor a

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20th century, huge flows of entered the United States. A sorbed millions upon millions this money from overseas help roads and settle the West. The such investment did the slight American ideal. Since those Europe and much of Asia have: ous devastating wars—and floo capital have ventured abroad bund industries and econom on earth has more investmen the United States.

the United States.

Some of this investme money looking merely for a go than a voice in managemen called portfolio investment I from direct investment (by midmestic company of property). domestic company or propert trolled by a foreign investor). (foreign investment on earth—t Conference Board to be wor the end of 1987—the U.S. had share, over 33 percent. The

